Introduction. Consider the following zero sum two person game. The players alternately choose points t t e [0,1] for i = 1, 2, •• ,n, the choice being made by player I if i is odd and by player II if i is even. After the ith move the player who is to make the (i + l)st move observes the value of φ t (t 19 t 21 , t t ) where φ t is some function on the idimensional closed unit cube to some set A t . The payoff is f(t 19 t 2 , , t n ) where / is a continuous, real-valued function.
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If all the φ i are constant we have the case of no information. Ville [1] showed that in this case such a game has a value. At the other extreme, if the φ t are all one-to-one we have the case of perfect information so the game has a value.
The purpose of the present paper is to show that, in general, games of the form introduced in the first paragraph do not have values and to consider two cases in which they do. The counter-examples to be presented will be compared with Ville's classical example of a game on the unit square which has no value.
It is shown in §2 that the games considered always have values when n -2.
An example of a game with no value is presented in § 3. In this example n = 3 and the φ t take only a finite number of values.
In § 4 it is shown that the additional hypothesis of continuity of the φ t is not sufficient to guarantee existence of a value. In that example n = 4. The case n = 3 with continuous φ t remains unsolved.
Section 5 deals with a special case for which n is arbitrary and yet the game has a value. In this case the φ t each take only a finite number of values and each is constant on sets which are finite unions of ί-dimensional generalized intervals.
The payoff function is given by M(x, y) = f(t λ (x, y) , t 2 (x, 2/), , t n (x, y)). The payoff as a function of mixed strategies will also be denoted by M.
In our case, since the moves are points in [0, 1] , the strategy spaces X and Y are products, usually infinite dimensional, each coordinate space being [0, 1] , Hence, the choice of a strategy by player I is equivalent to the choice of a distribution function F on X. It will be convenient to let the space P of mixed strategies for player I be the family of all distribution functions on X which assign probability 1 to a finite subset of X. The same will be done for Q, the space of mixed strategies for player II.
If H is a distribution function on the real line and S is any subset of the real line which is Borel measurable, we will let HS be the probability assigned to S by H.
For FeP we let F itOύ denote the marginal distribution function of the coordinate of player Γs strategy which corresponds to his ith move when φ 2ί _ 2 = a. Similar notation will be used for GeQ.
2. The case n = 2 Φ In this section it will be shown that any gamê of the type given in the introduction for which n = 2 has a value. It is not even necessary to assume that φ x is a measurable function. is the strategy space for player I in 2^ it can also be used as a strategy in K Let y be any pure strategy for player II in K Since ^(α*) e [0,1], it follows that y^a*) is a pure strategy for player II in ^(α*). Hence,
Let Cr be any strategy for player II in %? such that G lta =G {a>) for all aeA ± . Let a? be any pure strategy for player I in K For some aeA ± it must be true that x e Φϊ 1^) so that x is also a pure strategy for player I in g^(α). Then,
From the two inequalities obtained above it follows that the value of *& is v.
3.
A counter-example for n = 3. In this section the counterexample for n = 3 will be given. The functions φ t (i = 1, 2) each take only a finite number of values. The similarity of this example to Ville's example will be discussed.
For this example let
Let ί 7 be any strategy for player I. Fix ε > 0 and let δ e (0, ε) be sufficiently small so that i^(0, δ) < ε. Let G{S} = G{1 -δ} = 1/2. Then,
Let G be any strategy for player II. Fix ε > 0 and let x x e (0,1/2) be sufficiently small so that G(0,
Let x = (*!, * a ) so that x is a pure strategy for player I. Then,
and the game has no value. In Ville's example the payoff function is such as to force each player to attempt to choose a point closer to 1 than does his opponent without actually choosing 1. It is impossible for either player to guarantee he will achieve this with any preassigned positive probability no matter what pure strategy his opponent may use. In the example just presented a similar situation arises on the first two moves. In Ville's example the competition to choose a point close to the endpoint is. a direct competition over payoff. In the present example this competition is over the information player I will receive, which, of course, helps determine the payoff. If on his first move player I chooses a point closer to 0 (but not 0) than the choice of his opponent is to both 0 and 1, then he will obtain more accurate information about the location of his opponent's choice than would be the case otherwise. Player II is prevented from choosing an endpoint since to do so would be to give his opponent perfect information.
4 A counterexample with continuous Φ 4 In this section a counter-example will be presented in which the functions φ t are all continuous. In this example n = 4. Again a comparison will be made with Ville's example.
Let
(1 f(t 19 1 2 , ί 8 , ί 4 ) = I *χ -ί 4 1 -10 I ί a -ί 8 1 .
if ί 2 < t, < ± or -ί < t x < t 2 Δ if -i-^ ί x < 1 -ί,
£1
or 1 -ί, < ίx ^-±-
Li
Assume t 2 ΦQ or 1. Then, φ 3 (ί 1 , ί 2 , ί 8 ) > 0 for min(ί 2 , 1 -ί 3 ) < t x < 1/2 while φ s (t 19 1 2 , t 3 ) < 0 for 1/2 < ^ < max(ί 2 ,1 -t 2 ). On the other hand, Φs(*i> *a» *β) = 0 otherwise.
Let .F be any strategy for player I. Fix ε > 0 and let δ e (0, ε) be sufficiently small so that ^(0, δ] + F^l -δ, 1) < ε. Let
Let G assign probability 1/2 to each of the pure strategies (δ, 2/ 3 ) and (1 -δ, 2/ 2 ). Then,
M(F, G)^[ (--tλF^dt,) + [ U-
Let G be any strategy for player II. Fix ε > 0 and let δ e (0, ε) Π (0,1/2) be sufficiently small so that G li0 (0, 8) + G li0 (l -δ, 1) < ε. Let x 2 (a) = α/[δ(l -δ)] and let F assign probability 1/2 to each of the pure strategies (δ, »") and (1 -δ, x 2 ). When player I uses the strategy F the value of the nonpositive term in / will always be zero. Thus,
so that inί G sup F M(F, G) Ξ> 1/2 and the game has no value.
Here again the primary competition between the players is to make their first moves as close to the endpoints as possible without actually choosing the endpoints. If player I is successful in choosing a point t λ at least as close to one of the endpoints as is player IPs choice, then player II will have less information about t x than would be the case otherwise. Player I is prevented from choosing an endpoint by the fact that if he does so he will get no information about his opponent's first move so that he cannot guarantee that he can keep the negative term close to zero. Player II is prevented from choosing an endpoint by the fact that when he does so the function φ 3 will take the value zero no matter what his opponent does so that he will have no information about player Γs first move. 5* The case of information sets which are unions of generalized intervals* The case to be considered here is that in which each φ t takes only a finite number of values and each is constant only on sets which are finite unions of ί-dimensional generalized intervals. This is the only case considered in this paper in which n remains arbitrary.
Let the values of φ t be 1, 2, , m 4 . Let P 3 φι\k) be the projection on the jth coordinate of Φi\k) where j = 1, 2, , i. 
